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Abstract Committees established for the ethical review
of research involving animals have become a widespread
legal standard around the world. Despite many differences
in their composition, powers, and institutional settings,
they share many common problems related to the well-
established standards of procedural justice in administra-
tive practice. The paper adapts the general theory of pro-
cedural justice to the specific context of ethical review
committees. From this perspective, the main concerns over
the procedural aspects of the ethical evaluation of research
projects are identified and examined. They include in
particular the standards of the committees’ composition,
impartiality, fair hearing, appeal, transparency, and benev-
olence. Their proper reflection in the regulatory regimes of
animal ethics committees is necessary to secure the stan-
dards of fairness of the ethical review itself. This, in turn, is
a condition of the moral and social legitimacy of all
administrative and quasi-administrative procedures, in-
cluding the committees’ operations (irrespective of wheth-
er they are legally entrusted with the task of authorizing or
only evaluating research projects).
Keywords Law . Ethics . Animal welfare . Procedural
justice . Animal experimentation . Research ethics .
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Introduction
In the contemporary world, an ethical review of
animal research vested in independent committees
is becoming the widespread standard, at least in
developed legal systems. Despite many differences
in their composition, powers, and institutional set-
tings, they share many common problems related
to the well-established standards of procedural jus-
tice in administrative practice. Therefore, it is in-
teresting to inquire into the operation of such
committees from the perspective of the general
theory of procedural justice. The main context of
the inquiry offered in this paper is the European
institutional and legal setting of animal ethics
committees (AECs). Most of their procedural intri-
cacies seem, however, much more universal. Thus,
the argument and findings may be easily adapted
to other local contexts.
The paper sets out with a general overview of the
institution of AECs. Then, it distinguishes the substan-
tive and procedural aspects of AECs’ review of research
projects. The focus of further sections is on the proce-
dural side of AECs’ operation. After summarizing the
main tenets of procedural justice theory, the paper dis-
cusses from their perspective the following specific
issues: the composition of the AEC, the right to fair
hearing and appeal, and the requirement of benevolence
as well as the transparency of AEC proceedings. The
paper closes with some concluding remarks concerning
the need for proper balance between the values of fair-
ness and efficacy of AECs’ operation.
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Ethical Review Committees: Where Administration
and Ethics Meet
The contemporary system of AECs has its roots in the
idea of ethical oversight over medical research on hu-
man beings. The idea of establishing independent ethi-
cal committees responsible for verifying and approving
research projects appeared for the first time in the revi-
sion of the Helsinki Declaration on Ethical Principles of
Medical Research adopted by the World Health Orga-
nization in Tokyo in 1974. It was followed by the
development of the institution of ethical committees
supervising medical research involving human patients.
Over time, such supervision has become a widely rec-
ognized and implemented regulatory solution in most
parts of the world.
In the 1970s, the first ethical committees on animal
experimentation also began to appear. Hereinafter, by
“animal ethics committees” or “AECs,” I am referring to
the bodies entrusted with the task of the ethical evalua-
tion of research involving living animals. The need for
such evaluation is usually restricted to vertebrate ani-
mals only, which, according to scientific evidence, are
believed to be sentient. In some countries, there are
vertebrate species excluded from ethical supervision of
AEC, while in the current European law the scope of
animals included has been extended to cover also ceph-
alopods (as there is a strong evidence suggesting their
sentience, too).
Similarly, as in the case of their human counterparts,
there were two principal types of AECs (Rose 2012).
Some of them were established as internal bodies of
particular research institutes and limited in their scope
of operation to the supervision of the research conducted
within that specific institute. Committees of this kind
have been created since the 1970s in the United States,
Canada, and Australia. Some other countries adopted
laws giving rise to national and regional AECs respon-
sible for the ethical evaluation of all research conducted
in the facilities located in a given area. Such a system
was established for the first time in 1979 in Sweden.
An important step forward came when, in 1986, the
Council of Europe adopted the Covenant on the Protec-
tion of Vertebrate Animals Used for Experimental and
other Scientific Purposes. This obliged its parties to
ensure “an effective system of control and supervision”
over the rules laid down by the convention. In the same
year, similar duties were placed on the then member
states of the European Community by Council Directive
86/609/EEC (Council Directive 1986). It required that
each member state establish an authority to verify the
basic legal standards provided for by the directive. Fur-
thermore, the authority was to be notified in advance
about every research project involving animals so that it
could effectively watch the observance of the principles
of animal research in day-to-day laboratory practice.
Since then, both kinds of AECs have spread consid-
erably and today exist in most European countries as
well as becoming ubiquitous in American research prac-
tice (see Hansen, Goodman, and Chanda 2012). None-
theless, they still vary considerably in their functions,
mode of operation, and powers over the research they
supervise (Varga 2013). In Europe, the new directive on
the protection of animals used for scientific purposes
(EU/63/2010) requires that “an impartial project evalu-
ation independent of those involved in the study should
be carried out as part of the authorization process of
projects involving the use of live animals.” The provi-
sions of the directive mandate not only that no research
project be carried out without prior detailed evaluation
and authorization; they also command that such a re-
view must be performed by an independent and impar-
tial authority. Every institution using animals for re-
search must set up an internal animal welfare body to
provide advice on the proper conditions of animal use.
In addition, all research projects have to be evaluated
and approved by an external authority. The directive
strongly encourages all twenty-eight member states to
establish AECs as bodies competent enough to at least
conduct an independent evaluation of such research
projects. In some cases, such as in Poland, AECs are
authorized not only to evaluate but also to grant or deny
formal consent to perform any such project.
Nowadays, at least one such AEC exists in the
vast majority of the EU member states, while in
most of them, there are also local or regional
AECs evaluating research projects on the basis of
ethical standards imposed by the directive and
relevant national legislation. In some cases, they
advise competent authorities, while in others, they
evaluate and authorize all research projects involv-
ing animals. The committees usually include expert
scientists as well as representatives of other stake-
holders or the general public (Olsson et al. 2016;
Silva et al. 2015).
What is particularly interesting and specific for AECs
(alongside the parallel system of ethical committees
reviewing research involving human beings) is the very
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deep intertwining of legal and ethical standards guiding
their activities. They are supposed to perform an ethical
review but on the basis of the principles and rules
specified by the relevant laws. The latter govern both
the substantive and procedural aspects of the AEC han-
dling the cases submitted for review. Even if the Euro-
pean legislation is based on a general assumption that
most animal research remains, as a matter of principle,
indispensable and thus ethically defensible, an AEC
may refuse to approve individual projects on ethical
grounds. Thus, their decisions have more or less
direct—and sometimes far-reaching—consequences
for the rights and duties of those who seek to obtain
authorization for their research project. It entails that
they should be subjected to some form of ultimate
judicial control at least in respect to their compliance
with the relevant legal standards, in particular pertaining
to the procedural aspects of the committee’s proceed-
ings. That brings the committee back to the domain of
law through the frame of which the ethical review is to
be carried out.
The 3Rs as the Substantive Standard of Review
Today, the basis for the substantive ethical review of
animal experimentation has become known as the 3Rs
principle. It was formulated in the 1950s by two British
scientists—W.M.S. Russell and R.L. Burch (Russell
and Burch 1959)—even if its traces can be found in an
early nineteenth century medical treatise by M. Hall
(Hall 1831). According to this principle, every research
project involving sentient animals ought to be evaluated
on the basis of the criteria of replacement, reduction, and
refinement. Replacement means that an experiment
should be designed in a way to ensure that it obtains
its scientific purposes using animals only in cases when
they cannot be replaced by any alternative method or
means. Furthermore, it should involve as few animals as
possible and a species with the least developed sentience
(reduction). The refinement requirement is understood
as a duty to design an experiment in a way inflicting on
animals the least possible pain, suffering, or distress
(Chańska and Różyńska 2013).
The approach proposed by Russell and Burch has
been widely accepted and turned into ethical policy and
legal guidelines for animal research in many places all
over the world. In Europe, it has been incorporated into
Directive 63/2010 as the basic principles on which the
planning and evaluation of projects should rely. Accord-
ing to the directive, the ethical justifiability of an exper-
iment requires
… the selection of the method that is able to
provide the most satisfactory results and is likely
to cause the minimum pain, suffering or distress.
The methods selected should use the minimum
number of animals that would provide reliable
results and require the use of species with the
lowest capacity to experience pain, suffering, dis-
tress or lasting harm that are optimal for extrapo-
lation into the target species. (Recital 13)
The 3Rs principle is openly invoked in Article 4 of
the directive, where it lays down the obligation of mem-
ber states to ensure that “wherever possible, a scientifi-
cally satisfactory method or testing strategy, not
entailing the use of live animals, shall be used instead
of a procedure” (replacement). In addition, it is manda-
tory that “the number of animals used in projects is
reduced to a minimum without compromising the ob-
jectives of the project” (reduction) and that the “refine-
ment of breeding, accommodation and care, and of
methods used in procedures” eliminates or reduces to a
minimum the pain, suffering, or distress of the animals
involved (refinement). These principles are further de-
veloped in Article 13, determining that, when choosing
the methods used in the experiment, the one not only
using the lowest possible number of animals but also
using animals with the lowest capacity to experience
pain, suffering, or distress should be preferred.
Pursuant to the current European law and practice,
the 3Rs principle remains the important standard for the
ethical review of all research projects using sentient
animals. Article 38 of the directive provides that the
project evaluation should comprise an assessment of
its general ethical justifiability. It ought to be carried
out in the form of a utilitarian harm-benefit analysis,
weighing the expected scientific and social benefits and
the likelihood of their achievement with the amount of
“costs” in terms of the suffering of the animals involved
as well as its conformity to all aspects of the 3Rs
principle. In practice, the composition of the committees
favours a kind of “peer review” focused on the proper
design of the project rather than a more comprehensive,
extra-scientific “community review.” The latter would
require a prevalence of non-researchers in the composi-
tion of the committee as well as extending the review
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more openly to an assessment of the objectives of the
proposed projects if they seem at all doubtful in com-
parison with the value of animal suffering sacrificed to
achieve them (Rippe 2007). In reality, even in AECs
with a relatively broad representation of non-re-
searchers, they do not make up the majority. A relevant
example can be found in Poland, where the law requires
that AECs involve six researchers experienced in animal
experimentation, three additional researchers in the field
of the social sciences or humanities, and three layper-
sons representing non-governmental organizations ac-
tive in animal protection.
Nonetheless, the law specifies the conditions under
which the researchmay be considered ethically justified.
However, the application of those substantive criteria to
evaluate and authorize projects must be performed with-
in a certain procedural framework. The shape of the
latter may materially determine whether the outcome
of the ethical evaluation is perceived as legitimate and
fair. In some sense, for the overall acceptability of the
system of ethical licensing of research projects, it is
critical that the process of evaluation itself meets the
generally established standards of ethical justifiability.
The latter are commonly referred to as “natural” stan-
dards of procedural justice or fairness.
The Problem of Procedural Standards of Justice
The concept of procedural justice or fairness has been
developed in legal thought for centuries (Cane 2016).
Nonetheless, serious discussion of the theory of proce-
dural justice is rather recent. The locus classicus for the
modern theoretical account of the concept is John
Rawls’s seminal The Theory of Justice. The author
distinguished the idea of pure, perfect, and imperfect
procedural justice. Pure procedural justice implies that
there is no independent criterion of a just outcome other
than reaching it by means of a just procedure. Alterna-
tively, the idea of perfect procedural justice assumes that
there are independent criteria to determine the justice of
the outcome, but the procedure guarantees that the cor-
rect outcome is actually achieved. The idea of imperfect
procedural justice, in turn, entails that procedural con-
ditions do not guarantee the proper outcome but produce
the best possible chances of achieving it (Rawls 1999,
74). Meeting the standards of procedural justice seems
particularly important in conflicts rooted in inescapably
plural ethical attitudes, when, due to value pluralism, it
is nearly impossible to find agreement on the substance
of the matter in question (Ceva 2008).
Arguably, in practical settings, procedural justice can
only be imperfect. Moreover, the very idea of “pure”
procedural justice is criticized as incoherent. Discussing
the views put forward by Rawls, Sadurski (1995, 51)
maintains that “procedural justice is actually derivative
from substantive justice. We call certain procedures
‘just’ in so far as we believe that they tend to produce
materially just outcomes.” According to this approach,
the concept of procedural justice must never be “pure”
and fully independent of the substantive justice of the
outcomes because the connection between procedural
justice and just outcomes is empirical rather than con-
ceptual. Thus, procedural justice—as Sadurski puts it—
is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of sub-
stantive justice. Nonetheless, a proper (“just”) procedur-
al framework is the most effective means of making just
outcomes as achievable as practically possible. More-
over, a fairly designed procedure may significantly in-
crease the level of the legitimacy of the substantive
results for those affected. There is robust evidence de-
livered by social-psychological research that procedural
arrangements respecting the key requirements of proce-
dural justice make people perceive the decisions as more
acceptable, irrespective of their substance (Thibaut and
Walker 1975; Lind and Tyler 1988).
Thus, the findings of the contemporary procedural
justice theories strongly support the intuition present in
the history of legal thought from antiquity and encapsu-
lated by Seneca in the following words: “Qui aliquid
statuerit, parte inaudita altera, aequum licet dixerit,
haud aequum fecerit” (He who decides anything with-
out hearing both sides, although he may decide correct-
ly, has by no means acted justly). That is why contem-
porary law commonly demands that judicial or admin-
istrative decisions correspond not only to the substantive
standards determined by the relevant rules but stipulates
that the legality of a decision depend also on the obser-
vance of appropriate procedural standards. The latter are
based on the principles traditionally referred to as fair-
ness or natural justice.
Standards of Procedural Justice in an
Administrative Context
The traditional doctrine of natural justice, which is at the
heart of contemporary procedural standards, is usually
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conceived as being composed of two basic require-
ments—(i) the impartiality of the decision-makers and
(ii) a fair hearing for all those who have a legitimate
interest in the final outcome. The principle of impartial-
ity is considered to involve rules that exclude a conflict
of interests that could cause the decision-maker to be
biased or undermine his or her credibility as a neutral
umpire capable of deciding the case solely on its merits
(Pietrzykowski and Tobor 2003).
To avoid any conflict of interests, the law specifies
situations in which a decision-maker is to be held unable
(inhabilis) to take part in deciding the case and which
oblige him to be recused every time there are any other
reasons that may compromise his impartiality or call it
into question in the eyes of external observers
(suspectus). The typical sources of bias triggering the
duty to recuse include the following:
(i) a personal involvement in the case or a dependence
on the outcome (according to the principle nemo
iudex in causa sua);
(ii) family or professional relations with a party or
having a predetermined attitude in regard to the case
or any party thereto based on any earlier contacts;
(iii) conflicts or prejudices that may affect the way in
which the case is reviewed and the relevant opin-
ions formed.
The second basic requirement of procedural justice is
a fair hearing, namely, allowing the interested partici-
pants to be heard and to present their views, which are to
be taken into account in the decision-making process. It
entails appropriate access to information about the facts
and evidence that the decision-makers are to consider as
well as the right to respond to them and submit addi-
tional evidence or information that the participant finds
relevant for the case. All this should be done while
giving the interested parties reasonable time to act in
the proceedings and providing them with sufficient in-
formation and guidance or at least allowing them to
obtain such guidance from reliable sources.
Apart from these two basic elements of fair proce-
dure, there are several other requirements that should
also count as indispensable conditions of procedural
justice. These include internal and external transparen-
cy. In particular, the procedure must be transparent to
the parties, who should be properly informed about the
reasons for all decisions taken in their case. It allows
them to understand their own situation as well as the
motives for the resolutions that may adversely affect
their interests. At the same time, the duty to uncover
reasons curbs any arbitrariness of the decision-makers
and makes it easier to appeal and control the decision.
The procedure should also be reasonably transparent
externally (for the general public), meaning that it is
sufficiently open for the public opinion to build confi-
dence that the decisions are based on considerations of
legality, justice, and public interest (Bogucka and
Pietrzykowski 2015).
The requirement of transparency is closely linked to
the verifiability of decisions, which may also be consid-
ered as part of the modern doctrine of fair procedure. It
includes mechanisms allowing for the control of all
material decisions by courts or other appellate (higher
authority) institutions. Additionally, decisions should be
reasonably open for independent scrutiny by competent
external institutions (such as control agencies) and the
public.
The last, but by no means least, condition worth
mentioning is benevolence. This notion is under-
stood here as sufficient respect for the legitimate
interests of the parties by the procedural arrange-
ments as well as the actual operations of the
decision-makers executing those arrangements in
practice. To meet the standard of benevolence,
the agencies have to provide some level of assis-
tance to the participants in their proceedings. Such
proactive assistance may be necessary to help the
latter effectively promote their legitimate interests
or exercise the rights they hold. In particular, the
participants should not be allowed to make detri-
mental mistakes resulting from insufficient aware-
ness of their procedural situation and the legal
framework in which they operate.
It is obvious that all these conditions are closely
related to one another and entail numerous more de-
tailed rules and guarantees that contribute to the general
quality of the procedural standards applicable in specific
cases and types of proceedings.
Procedural Justice Before Animal Ethics
Committees
It is obvious that the procedures applied in AECs raise
specific questions that in many cases differ from those
typical of general administrative proceedings. Thus, the
general standards discussed above need some adaptation
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and adjustment to address the peculiarities of the review
they perform. Moreover, the regulations governing their
operations differ in various legal systems. This means
that specific procedural problems arise and are resolved
under particular rules of applicable law.
Nonetheless, I believe that there is a range of rela-
tively common problems that may be identified and
outlined largely irrespective of the details of local legal
settings. They are typical for this kind of institution as
well as most similar kinds of ethical committees (such as
those dedicated to reviewing research involving human
beings). They are, obviously, partially related to local
laws as well as the respective scientific and administra-
tive culture. Within this scope, the views presented here
are offered from a mainly European perspective.
Composition of the Committees and the Question
of a Conflict of Interest
As mentioned above, one of the two fundamental prin-
ciples of “natural” procedural justice is believed to be
impartiality. For a collective body such as an AEC, this
extends to all its members and entails the duty to ex-
clude from the panel deciding the particular case anyone
who finds him or herself in a conflict of interest. How-
ever, the majority of the members of AECs are usually
active researchers, often professionally related to the
institutions the reviewed projects come from (Schuppli
and Fraser 2007; Russell 2012; Johnson 2013). If an
AEC is internal to the institution, it is even possible for
all its decisions to pertain to projects brought by col-
leagues and co-workers of the members of the commit-
tee. For obvious reasons, this may be conceived as a
serious threat to the ability of the committee to impar-
tially evaluate and opine on the projects.
One solution that could be taken into account is
reducing the number of AEC members being ac-
tive researchers (today they usually make up the
majority of a committee). This could, however,
compromise the AEC’s capability to draw on the
easily available professional expertise of its mem-
bers. Another solution could be to invite external
experts or researchers from other institutions to sit
on the committee, but this may in some cases
create an opposite conflict of interest resulting
from the intense competition between scientists
affiliated with various institutions and teams work-
ing in the same field of research. It would also not
eliminate the deeper problem of scientists’ general
bias in favour of research. Such bias may be
irrespective of any personal ties to the institutions
or investigators to conduct it. There might be,
however, an opposite bias among the non-
scientific activists applying to sit on an AEC, in
particular in cases where the public is represented
mainly by members of non-governmental organiza-
tions engaged in animal protection. Some partial
solution mitigating the partiality problem may be
to have internal assessments of projects within an
AEC assigned to its two members—a scientist
reviewing the validity and correctness of the pro-
ject and a non-scientist highlighting the relevant
ethical concerns (Silverman et al. 2017).
Apart from this, the question arises as to the scope of
what should count as a conflict of interest in the context
of researchers evaluated by their peers sitting on the
AEC. It seems plausible to claim that the sole fact of
being affiliated with the same institution, or even a
personal acquaintance, does not create such a conflict.
In order to regard the situation as unacceptable from the
perspective of the impartiality principle, it is necessary
that a member of the AEC has some special, direct ties
to the project or the individuals involved in its prepara-
tion or planned performance. They may be of various
nature—personal, professional, financial, or family—
but have to be sufficiently close to cast doubts on the
ability of a given member of the AEC to form an
unbiased opinion. Only such grounds disqualify the
member as a disinterested, impartial umpire and entail
the duty to recuse him from deciding the case.
What is crucial, however, is the rigorous duty to
report any alleged conflict of interests so that the AEC
may openly deliberate and decide on whether a given
relation suffices to recuse a member from taking part in
reviewing a given project. The AEC must be made
aware upfront of the fact and nature of the relationship
between its member and the proposed project. Only
under this condition may the relatively narrow scope
of what should be regarded as an inacceptable conflict of
interest be a sufficient safeguard of the fundamental
value of impartiality in the AEC’s decision-making.
Participation of an Applicant: Fair Hearing and Appeal
The second basic condition of procedural justice is a fair
hearing. It is understood as the right of all whose inter-
ests may be affected by the outcome of the procedure to
present their position and arguments so that they can be
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taken into account by the decision-making bodies. In the
context of an AEC, the main beneficiary of the right to a
fair hearing is the researcher applying for a positive
opinion or consent to undertake the project. The appli-
cant’s main way of presenting their views to the AEC is
via the application process, which involves the applicant
justifying the point of the proposal. In many situations,
however, the standard of a fair hearing may demand
much more than just this initial opportunity for the
applicant to make his case before the AEC.
It may happen that the committee finds the arguments
submitted in the application unpersuasive and insuffi-
cient to accept the project. Arguably, in such a situation,
the applicant should have the right to address the doubts
or objections of the AEC members. In other words, the
application should not be declined without first giving
the applicant a chance to respond to the reasons that the
AEC is considering as potential grounds to deny the
proposal. In addition, it should include the chance to
modify, improve, or redesign the project to comply with
the conditions (if any) under which the AEC would be
ready to find it ethically acceptable. Thus, the respect for
the standard of a fair hearing implies that the applicant
should be informed about the views of the committee
before it takes its final decision, in particular if such
views may render the proposal ultimately rejected.
This requires in practice that AECs should proceed
not on the basis of the application only, taking their
decision without any further involvement of the appli-
cant. To meet the requirements of a fair hearing, the
practice of AECs should mandate inviting applicants to
a committee session, or postponing a decision that is to
be negative where the applicant was not given an op-
portunity to address the AEC’s concerns. Without
implementing such solutions, the procedure may be
considered seriously flawed from the perspective of fair
hearing standards.
An applicant should also have a right to appeal so
that the decision may be reviewed by an independent
body to verify potential mistakes resulting in an inaccu-
rate assessment of the project. In practice, it is particu-
larly problematic to find a procedural way to verify the
decisions favourable to applicants. Standardly, the right
to appeal is vested within the party to the procedure. In
the case of an AEC, typically the only party is the
applicant. This makes it difficult to have the AEC deci-
sion reviewed and corrected in cases when the applica-
tion is actually accepted despite legal, ethical, or
scientific reasons to deny it. This important matter will
be briefly addressed further below.
Transparency
Although it is usually not mentioned in traditional ac-
counts of procedural justice, it seems clear that transpar-
ency has today become one of the main standards of all
operations of most (if not all) public authorities
(Bogucka and Pietrzykowski 2015). This also includes
independent committees as long as they are entrusted
with the power to decide on the rights and duties of
others. This is usually the case with AECs, and the role
of transparency to the public and its possible effects on
the scope of research considered as ethically defensible
is emphasized in the literature (Russell 2012). It is also
pointed out that the transparency of animal research is a
special case of a wider discourse on science-society
relations (MacLeod and Hobson-West 2016). The ques-
tion of the transparency of their operations has two
distinct aspects. The first is the composition of the
committee, which may materially affect the level of
social control over its workings. The second aspect is
the scope of the confidentiality of the information about
the projects and the AECs’ deliberations.
As regards the question of AECs’ composition, it is
important to allow members of the public to form a part
of the committee. The public should be, however, rep-
resented not by random laymen totally disinterested in
the animal research but rather persons designated by
non-governmental organizations active in animal pro-
tection. Otherwise, non-researcher members of AECs
may be unable to contribute a substantiated ethical
argument to the review of advanced scientific projects
and hence remain passive and actually ineffective mem-
bers of the AEC (Schuppli and Fraser 2007). When the
public is adequately represented, the diversification of
the AEC’s composition has obvious advantages for the
scope of considerations and sensitivities playing their
part in the AECs’ decisions. Moreover, it may also
mitigate the risks of suspicions and mistrust from the
side of public opinion. An AEC deprived of this advan-
tage tends to become just one more professional peer-
review expert panel guided by the narrow scope of
largely uniform, shared values.
The level of transparency is also dependent on the
access to the information that is made available to the
general public. The scientific community strongly op-
poses wide access to such information, pointing out the
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need to protect sensitive data pertaining to the design of
projects and innovative research ideas (Holmberg and
Ideland 2012). The conflict of those goals and values
has been acknowledged in the present EU Directive 63/
2010, which reads: “To ensure that the public is in-
formed, it is important that objective information
concerning projects using live animals is made publicly
available. This should not violate proprietary rights or
expose confidential information” (41).
In this way, the directive tries to somehow reconcile
considerations of transparency with the confidentiality
of information that may have high commercial or scien-
tific value. The solution it lays down provides for a duty
to publish “anonymous non-technical summaries of
those projects” that should be sufficiently general to
remain comprehensible to laymen, preserve the ano-
nymity of researchers, and avoid the disclosure of those
details of projects that could compromise the vital inter-
ests of researchers or their sponsors.
The regulation is an important step toward striking
the proper balance between those contrasting points of
view. There is no reason, however, why it should not be
supplemented by a right to demand access to the docu-
ments produced by the AEC in regard to a particular
case by anyone interested. What should be excluded
from such access should be, on an exceptional basis,
only those parts of the content of the documents that
contain confidential information of commercial value.
This is the only way to let public opinion be confident
that the committees are actually independent, impartial,
and diligent guardians of the public interest, taking
decisions based on the balancing of all relevant
considerations.
Admittedly, such access may increase the risk of
unsympathetic public reactions to at least some of the
particularly painful projects. Nonetheless, the genuine
dialogue between the scientific community and the gen-
eral public cannot be based on hiding and limiting
access to the ways in which animals are actually used
in the research. Moreover, it could also help solve one of
the main loopholes in the operation of many ethical
committees. This is namely the lack of any means to
appeal against the committee’s decision if it is
favourable to an applicant. Even if the approval of a
project is clearly wrong, the researcher is satisfied with
the decision. If there are no other parties to the proceed-
ings, there is nobody entitled to appeal the decision.
In practice, there seem to be two possible solutions to
this situation. One is the right of each individual AEC
member who voted against its decision to initiate its
revision by an appropriate body of higher authority. It
could be designed analogically to the well-established
regulation applied in company law where each share-
holder may contest before the court the resolutions
adopted by the shareholders’ assembly. A solution of
this kind exists in Switzerland although within the legal
framework in which the AEC issues an advisory opinion
only, but each of its members may challenge the further
decision of the respective administrative authority li-
censing research projects.
An alternative solution could be some external
agents, such as animal welfare organizations, being able
to appeal or contest AEC decisions. Such a possibility
exists currently under Polish law. It allows non-
governmental organizations interested in a case being
held before an administrative authority to apply for
admission as a party to that case. If granted such admis-
sion, the organization obtains all the rights of a partici-
pant, including the standing to appeal against the final
decision.
In effect, in Poland, animal welfare organizations are
entitled to request admission to become a party in any
case heard before the AEC and thus obtain the right to
challenge the final approval of the project before an
appellate committee and then in administrative court.
There is a paradox, however. Formally, such an organi-
zation, until it is actually admitted to the procedure, is
not allowed to obtain any information about the relevant
case. As a result, a kind of “catch-22” emerges—an
organization may receive access to the relevant infor-
mation only by being admitted to ongoing proceedings,
but in order to apply for such admission, the organiza-
tion needs information it is not entitled to obtain before
it is granted the status of a party.
This vicious circle is circumvented in various
ways in practice. Nonetheless, it demonstrates that
the strict confidentiality of all information about
the matters handled by AECs (except for the sole
publication of non-technical summaries of the pro-
jects, which may take place long after the project
has actually been accepted) is an excessive limita-
tion of transparency without any clear justification.
A much better and fairer solution is a wider open-
ing of access to information on the issues heard
before AECs with severe penalties for anyone who
would abuse such access to try to obtain undue




Another condition of procedural justice worth mention-
ing is of a somewhat different nature. It concerns min-
imizing the risk that the parties to AEC proceedings may
suffer any disadvantage due to a lack of knowledge of
their own situation and its legal aspects. In other words,
an AEC should take utmost care that the legitimate
interests of the respective parties to its proceedings are
not unfairly affected by its decisions. Therefore, the
committee ought to take reasonable care that all inter-
ested parties are able in practice to advocate their case
and exercise their rights within the proceedings.
This entails the duty to keep the parties duly in-
formed, to reckon with all entities involved or affected
by the case, and to avoid imposing on the parties exces-
sive duties or constraints making it difficult for them to
effectively pursue their goals. Additionally, the AEC
should not neglect the need to explain its decisions,
submitting reasons and clarifications—if necessary—
as to why some arguments advanced by the parties are
unsuccessful. All this is highly instrumental for main-
taining and reinforcing trust in the good faith, profes-
sional competence, and proper motives of AECs. Im-
proving such trust between the scientific community
and public opinion is one of the key benefits that may
be brought by the establishment and proper working of
ethical committees.
Concluding Remarks: Fairness vs
Efficacy—Towards the Right Balance
The considerations above prove that the procedural
justice perspective is a useful and adequate instrument
through which to examine and improve at least some
deficiencies in the current way AECs are built and
operate. Applying standards of procedural justice to
AECs widens the scope of the discussion over their
model and operation. The predominant view of the
AEC focuses on its role in safeguarding substantive
ethical standards of animal research. Without prejudice
to that end it is necessary, however, to found the AEC
itself on an ethically viable basis so that it actually
improves the standards of ethics in the scientific com-
munity. In particular, the procedural justice approach
may materially help in refining the rules and practices of
AECs to better address the basic standards of fair
procedure.
As with everything else, the concern over stan-
dards of procedural justice comes at a price. In
this case, the price is mainly the speed and effi-
cacy of the procedure as well as the comfort and
ease of the tasks assigned to the AECs’ members.
However, it is certainly a price worth incurring.
The role of the AEC is to properly balance some
of the most vital moral concerns of modern times.
On one side is the advancement of science, possi-
bly essential for humans and animals to flourish
(even if often much less consequential or in some
cases even trivial). On the other is the suffering
inflicted on animals, sometimes amounting to ex-
treme suffering that in any other context it would
count as the utterly intolerable torturing of sentient
creatures.
Finding the proper balance between those values
requires diligence and care that can only be achieved
by safeguarding appropriate procedural standards. Thus,
the significance of designing and complying with at
least the basic elements of procedural justice by AECs
is twofold. First, it is instrumental to pursue the substan-
tive objectives of their deliberations pertaining to some
of the paramount concerns of modern societies. Second,
there is some inherent value in following fair procedure.
AECs are vested with authority affecting the vital inter-
est of researchers, science, society, and sentient animals.
The body entrusted with the right to issue ethical ver-
dicts on such a fundamental domain of social practices
most certainly ought to satisfy proper ethical standards
itself.
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